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Legal Personality, Minority Religions and 
Religious Accommodation in Eastern Europe 
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Abstract. An important aspect of religious accommodation in the public sphere is the willin-
gness or otherwise of the State to accommodate religious groups, as well as individuals professing 
religious beliefs. The accommodation of religion in the public sphere can depend upon law and 
policy makers choosing to recognise certain beliefs and practices as religious beliefs and practices 
and, in certain contexts, this recognition is contingent upon religious groups acquiring legal per-
sonality. Achieving this recognition has proved to be problematic for minority religious groups, 
especially in Eastern European jurisdictions.
This paper seeks to consider State responses to regulating minority religions, including new reli-
gious movements, in Eastern Europe by reference to a number of recent cases before the European 
Court of Human Rights.  It will pay particular attention to the extent to which approaches to the 
acquisition of legal personality for religious groups may restrict or undermine religious freedom 
and accommodation. 
Keywords: Human rights, Freedom of religion or belief, Religious organisations, Legal 
personality.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that the right to religious freedom entails the protec-
tion of both individual and collective elements.2 Thus an important aspect 
of religious accommodation in the public sphere is the willingness or oth-
erwise of the State to accommodate the beliefs and practices of religious 
groups, as well as individuals professing religious beliefs. 
The accommodation of religion in the public sphere can depend upon 
law and policy makers choosing to recognise certain beliefs and practices 
as religious beliefs and practices and, in certain contexts, this recognition 
1 Lecturer in Law, The Open University, UK. I thank the two anonymous reviewers and 
Claudine McFaul for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
2 For an extended treatment of this point see Rivers 2010.
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is contingent upon religious groups acquiring legal personality. Achieving 
this recognition has proved to be problematic for minority religious groups, 
especially in Eastern European jurisdictions3. A recent report by the Organi-
sation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereafter OSCE) argues 
that obstacles to the acquisition of legal personality for minority religious 
groups can ‘negatively affect the rights of a wide range of religious or belief 
communities.’ (OSCE/ODHIR 2014, 5) 
This paper will seek to consider State responses to regulating minority 
religions, including new religious movements4, in Eastern Europe by refer-
ence to a number of recent cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereafter ECtHR).  It will pay particular attention to the extent to 
which approaches to the acquisition of legal personality for religious groups 
may restrict or undermine religious freedom and accommodation. 
This paper will begin by an explanation of the concept of legal person-
ality and a consideration of its significance for the protection of religious 
freedom under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereafter ECHR). It will then place the development of the ECtHR’s 
Article 9 jurisprudence in the context of the post-Soviet expansion of the 
Council of Europe before examining recent judgments on the issue of State 
recognition of minority religions in Russia where legal personality has been 
at issue. Finally, it will offer some concluding remarks on the nature of the 
challenges faced by unfamiliar minority religions seeking recognition in an 
increasingly heterodox religious landscape.
Legal Personality
Legal personality is an axiomatic legal concept.5 A person, in law, is the 
subject of legal rights and duties. A legal person can, in principle, enforce 
rights in court, be held liable for breach of legal duties, be deemed capable 
of entering into a contract or owning property. Legal personality is largely 
synonymous with human personhood but is nevertheless conceptually dis-
tinct from it; natural legal persons (human beings) are most obviously the 
3 Note that for the purposes of this paper Eastern Europe is given a wide geographical 
definition and includes Russia. All states referred to are signatories of the ECHR. 
4 The term ‘minority religion’ is used broadly in this paper to refer to religious groups that do 
not part form part of the dominant religious culture in a state. ‘New religious movements’ 
(NRMs) is used in the religious studies literature to refer groups that manifest forms of 
religious innovation, although there is debate regarding whether these forms of religiosity 
are entirely novel. For further discussion of this point and a helpful introductory overview 
of the literature on NRMs see Hammer and Rothstein 2012.
5 For a detailed discussion of the concept of legal personality see Smith 1928, Naffine 2003 
and Note 2001.
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objects around which legal rights and duties coalesce. The idea that legal 
personhood is conceptually distinct from the human person echoes a simi-
lar distinction present in philosophy and theology. 6
The legal orthodoxy pertaining to legal personality is that it is a prag-
matic fiction the construction of which facilitates the coalescence of par-
ticular legal rights and duties. In this sense, the concept of legal personality 
is merely a technical abstraction as Smith helpfully explains:
To say that a subject has legal personality is to say that it is a party to legal 
relations without indicating in particular what the relations are. To say 
that one has title, is to say that one is a party to a particular class of legal 
relations, namely, those which go with the ownership of property. In either 
case, if one takes away all the rights, powers, privileges and immunities 
that shelter under the term, there is nothing left except the shelter which, 
thereafter, is but a word without a meaning. (Smith 1928, 294)
From this pragmatic perspective, legal rights and duties can therefore, in 
principle, be allowed to coalesce around any entity, natural or artificial. Hu-
man beings are generally given the status of natural legal personhood and 
it is well established that corporations can function as legal persons to serve 
the pragmatic purpose of groups of persons engaged in a common purpose. 
7 However, the actual conferral of legal personality is sometimes contested 
and can be revealing of changing societal attitudes to the status of particular 
individuals or groups within society.  For example, legal systems were able 
to facilitate the existence of human slavery by denying slaves legal personal-
ity. 8 Likewise, the position of women in legal history illustrates that being 
human is not always sufficient to be the object of a full range of legal rights 
and duties; women were not considered to be legal persons in their own 
right by the common law9. More recently challenges to the conferral of legal 
6 For example, the idea that a person might not necessarily be a human being has long been 
present in Christian Theology where the doctrine of the trinity holds that God is Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit. Cardinal Newman, writing in the 19th Century, wrote that ‘person’ is 
the word: ‘… we venture to use in speaking of those three distinct and real modes in which it 
has pleased Almighty God to reveal to us His being’ (cited in OED 2016).
7 For example Salomon v Salomon and Co  (1897) is the seminal case on corporate legal 
personality in UK law. 
8 An example of the importance of legal personality in the emancipation of slaves can be seen 
in the English case of Somerset v Stewart (1772). For an extended treatment of how US 
courts have approached the issue of personhood and slavery see Note, 2001.
9 For example, in his 1765 text Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone 
argued that by marriage a husband and wife are one person in law and for the duration of 
the marriage the woman’s independent legal existence is suspended and consolidated into 
that of her husband’s. ‘By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the 
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
16
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personality have focused on attempts to break down the well-established 
legal divide between persons and animals.10 In this way legal personality 
can be seen as a social construction which is revealing of wider social and 
political trends. 
A long running theme within legal philosophy is the extent to which 
the concept of the legal person should in some sense be rooted in the con-
cept of a natural legal person or human being. Naffine (2010) provides a 
survey of this discussion arguing that two key positions can be ascertained: 
the legalist and the realist. A legalist takes the view that non legal attrib-
utes are irrelevant in determining whether or not to class a thing as a legal 
person. The realist position differs in that legal personality should only be 
conferred on things with certain non-legal attributes; whether it be reason, 
a soul or sentience. She suggests that all of these approaches have influenced 
the way law approaches the legal person: 
The concept of the person, I suggest, takes its meaning from all four meta-
physical positions. All the approaches I consider have currency. All in-
fluence legal thinking but not in equal measure. Some ways of thinking 
about who and what we are, and how law should reflect that understand-
ing, are more powerful than others because they are so much a part of 
legal orthodoxy. Others represent relatively new and controversial ways of 
thinking about law’s subject. (Naffine 2010, 115)
The argument presented in this paper is that, in principle, the rights 
and duties which constitute legal personality can coalesce around any entity, 
whether a natural human person, a corporation or even a non-human ani-
mal. This paper will make the case that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR re-
veals that in some instances the way in which legal personality is conferred 
by states, and overseen by the courts, is informed by the ‘realist’ approach 
to legal personality, in that legal personality is more easily conferred on re-
ligious organisations which fit the pre-existing templates of what a religion 
should ‘conventionally’ look like. Further, in some instances, the decision 
to grant or withhold legal personality to particular religious groups illus-
trates the role of the State in the social construction of religion and is thus 
a means of State control of religious freedom. (Temperman 2013)
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and 
cover, she performs everything…’ (Blackstone 1765, 442) 
10 Animals are generally seen as property and conceptually ineligible for the status of legal 
personality. However this has been subject to sustained legal challenge in the USA by the 
Non-Human Rights Project, a campaign group who have launched a series of cases seeking 
review of the lawfulness of the detention of a number of chimpanzees in New York State. 
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Legal Personality and the Protection of Freedom of 
Religion under the ECHR
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that legal personality can apply 
equally readily to corporations as to human persons. Religious organisations 
are also able to take advantage of this legal form in a variety of different ways 
across Europe’s national jurisdictions. 11 This can principally be achieved by 
enacting legislation, the conclusion of a covenant, registration, or through 
conclusion of co-operation agreements. If there is no legal mechanism for 
the conferral of legal personality on religious groups the group will rely on 
the general law. If a religious group fails to meet a jurisdiction’s requirements 
for the conferral of legal personality, or choose not to acquire it, they still 
benefit from the protection of freedom of religion under Article 9 ECHR.12 
Note that Article 9 protects the communal aspect of religious freedom. 
Under 9(1) the individual has a right to manifest religious belief in commu-
nity with others. The ECtHR has long held that this should be interpreted 
in such a way that a religious organization can itself benefit from the protec-
tion afforded by Article 9 as a representative of the members of the group13. 
In X and Church of Scientology v Sweden App no 7805/77 (1979) at [2] the 
court held that ‘the distinction between the Church and its members…is 
essentially artificial. When a church body lodges an application under the 
Convention, it does so…on behalf of its members. It should therefore be ac-
cepted that a church body is capable of possessing and exercising the rights…
in its own capacity as a representative of its members.’ This principle was 
later given unequivocal confirmation in Leela Förderkreis e.V. and others 
v. Germany (2009) at [79] where the court stated that ‘a religious associa-
tion may, as such, exercise on behalf of its members the rights guaranteed 
by Article 9.’ As Garlicki (2007, 218) points out  most religions ‘cannot be 
11 Doe (2011) provides a helpful survey of the legal mechanisms for the conferral of legal 
personality on religious organisations.
12 Article 9 sets the protection of freedom of religion under the ECHR as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.
13 Note that this is a departure from the ECtHR’s original position as exemplified in Church 
of X v UK (1968) 29 CD 70: where in proceedings brought by a church seeking to rely 
on the protections offered by Article 9 it ruled that ‘a corporation being a legal and not a 
natural person is incapable of having or exercising [ECHR] rights’.
18
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exercised in a proper manner if the believers are deprived of the possibility 
to act collectively. Thus, individual freedom of religion cannot be guaran-
teed unless there is a collateral guarantee for the freedom to found and to 
operate a church or other religious community.’
The nature and range of protections afforded to religious organisations 
under Article 9 has been developed by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in 
a number of recent cases raising a range of issues in relation to the institu-
tional life of religious communities including employment, state privileges 
tax, property and freedom of worship in addition to issues relating to legal 
personality. 14  
As alluded to above, obtaining legal personality is not necessary to 
qualify for protection under Article 9; collective religious freedom exists 
as a right independent of the recognition of legal entity status. It is well 
established that Article 1115 includes the right not only to establish an as-
sociation but also to obtain legal recognition of that entity:
That citizens should be able to form a legal entity in order to act col-
lectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects 
of the right to freedom of association, without which that right would be 
deprived of any meaning. (Sidiropoulos v. Greece (1998) at [40])
However, despite the fact that religious groups can claim the protec-
tion offered by the ECHR regardless of their domestic legal status, the 
acquisition of legal personality does, in practice, generate clear advantages 
for religious communities under national law. ‘Once legal personality is ac-
quired, national laws confer a range of benefits—in terms of their autono-
my, property, and finance, and in the fields of education, spiritual care in 
public institutions, and marriage.’(Doe 2011, 110) For example:
The Constitution of Poland (Article 25.1) and the “Law on Guarantees 
of freedom of religion” of Poland provide that, in carrying out their func-
tions, religious organizations may, among other activities: determine re-
ligious doctrine, dogma and rites; organize and publicly perform religious 
14 A recent example of case involving article 9 and employment rights is Fernández Martínez v. 
Spain (2014) and on taxation The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. UK (2014).
15 Article 11 ECHR:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
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rites; lead the ministry of chaplains; govern themselves in accordance with 
their own rules (legal autonomy); establish, educate and employ clergy; 
acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property and manage it; 
produce, buy and sell objects of worship; use mass media; conduct educa-
tional activities; conduct charitable activities; create inter-church organi-
zations at the state level; and belong to international religious organiza-
tions. 16 (OSCE /ODHIR 2014 at [30])
The OSCE /ODHIR have highlighted the importance of legal personality 
for religious organisation for the protection of freedom of religion. 
When the organizational life of the community is not protected by the 
freedom of religion or belief, all other aspects of the individual’s freedom 
of religion become vulnerable. The ability to establish a legal entity to 
act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important 
aspects of the freedom of association, without which that right would be 
deprived of any meaning. As regards the organization of a religious com-
munity, a refusal to recognize it as a legal entity has also been found 
to constitute an interference with the right to freedom of religion under 
Article 9 of the ECHR as exercised by both the community itself and its 
individual members. (OSCE /ODHIR 2014 at [18]) 
Langlaude Done (2016) provides a persuasive argument that ECtHR rec-
ognition of the significance of legal personality illustrates the importance 
given to the autonomy of religious groups. This is a key plank in the Article 
9 jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Further, it shows that the ECtHR argues 
autonomy for religious groups is an important contributory factor to the 
success of pluralism in a democratic society. The ECtHR has argued that 
‘pluralism is indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over the centuries, depends on [freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion]’. (Kokkinakis v. Greece (1994) at [31]) The importance of the au-
tonomy of religious groups in a democratic society was reaffirmed in Hasan 
and Chaush v. Bulgaria (2002) and the following reasoning of the court in 
that case is worth noting at some length as it is a clear illustration of the 
importance of this principle:
The Court recalls that religious communities traditionally and universal-
ly exist in the form of organised structures. They abide by rules which are 
often seen by followers as being of a divine origin. [...] Where the organi-
sation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the Convention 
16 
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must be interpreted in the light of Article 11, which safeguards associa-
tive life against unjustified State interference. Seen in this perspective, the 
believers’ right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that 
the community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary 
State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious commu-
nities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus 
an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. It di-
rectly concerns not only the organisation of the community as such but also 
the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all its active 
members. Were the organisational life of the community not protected by 
Article 9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the individual’s freedom 
of religion would become vulnerable. (Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria 
(2002) at [62])
An important case on this issue arose from the registration regime in Mol-
dova and it is helpful to consider aspects of this case in some detail as it 
serves to summarise the ECtHR’s approach to the significance of the con-
ferral of legal personality to religious organisations for the protection of 
their religious freedom. 
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova (2002) the applicants 
had joined together to form the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia – a 
local, autonomous Orthodox Church. The government refused legal per-
sonality status to the church on the grounds recognition would provoke 
conflicts with the orthodox community. In this significant judgment the 
ECtHR ruled that: 
While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it 
also implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest [one’s] religion” alone and 
in private or in community with others, in public and within the circle 
of those whose faith one shares… the right of believers to freedom of reli-
gion, which includes the right to manifest one’s religion in community 
with others, encompasses the expectation that believers will be allowed to 
associate freely, without arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autono-
mous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in 
a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection 
which Article 9 affords […]In addition, one of the means of exercising the 
right to manifest one’s religion, especially for a religious community, in 
its collective dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection 
of the community, its members and its assets.  (Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia v. Moldova (2002) at [128]) 
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Although states are permitted to require registration in order for religious 
associations to acquire legal personality such schemes should not be par-
ticularly onerous or discriminatory. The OSCE advise that, ‘access to legal 
personality for religious or belief communities should be quick, transpar-
ent, fair, inclusive and non-discriminatory.  Any procedure that provides 
religious or belief communities with access to legal personality status should 
not set burdensome requirements.’ (OSCE/ODHIR 2014 at [24-25]).
Particular examples are given of onerous or discriminatory require-
ments that include requirements for minimum numbers, length of exist-
ence, citizenship status of adherents and approval of other groups. (OSCE/
ODHIR 2014 at [27-39]). Many of these issues have been highlighted in 
ECtHR litigation that originated in Russia. Russian decisions in limiting 
access to legal personality for religious groups have frequently been ruled 
to be in violation of freedoms protected by the ECHR. A number of cases 
have shown that minority religious groups are particularly likely to fall foul 
of these legislative hurdles. This paper will explore recent cases on this topic 
in detail after considering the background to religious freedom in the Rus-
sian Federation and the challenge faced by the ECtHR in the context of the 
post-Soviet enlargement of the Council of Europe.   
The Regulation of Religious Groups in Post-soviet 
Europe 
The issue of legal personality for religious organisations has been the sub-
ject of several ECtHR rulings over recent years. Many of them have their 
origin in disputes regarding the registration of minority religions or new 
religious movements in ex-Soviet states which introduced or adapted rules 
regarding the registration of religious groups in the 1990s. Registration of 
religious groups is common in former Soviet states, for example Latvia’s Law 
on Religious Organisations of 7 September 1995, Romania’s Law 489/2006 
on the Freedom of Religion and the General Status of Denominations, Mol-
dova’s Religious Denominations Act (Law no. 979-XII of 24 March 1992). 
Hungary’s recent registration law Act no. CCVI of 2011 (“the Church Act 
2011”) on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Legal 
Status of Churches was the subject of proceedings before the ECtHR in 
Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Ors v Hungary (2014). It is help-
ful to place the proliferation of cases challenging the registration regimes for 
religious groups in the broader context of the post-Soviet expansion of the 
Council of Europe.
22
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As Evans (2010, 321) points out the ECtHR jurisprudence in relation 
to Art 9 was limited and ‘looked for many decades as though it was going 
to be effectively a dead letter.’ Indeed it was not until Kokkinakis v Greece 
(1994) that the court found a violation of Article 9. But the post-Soviet 
period led to a sharp increase in the number of Article 9 cases with 60 ad-
ditional cases in the first decade of the new millennium compared to only 
30 up to that point (Evans 2010, 321).  This increase is partly symptomatic 
of the transition that Eastern European states were making in consequence 
of becoming signatories to the ECHR. Sadurski (2004, 400) argues this 
widened membership provides a diversity and heterogeneity within the con-
stituency of the Council of Europe which is in clear contrast to the original 
Treaty signatories who were a ‘club of largely like-minded West European 
countries which share[d] much of their legal and political culture and tradi-
tions.’ This expansion led to an increase in cases before the ECtHR from 
Eastern European jurisdictions relating to ‘egregious violations of human 
rights.’ (Sadurski 2009, 401). The result being that the ECtHR were re-
quired to respond to this more challenging expanded environment by play-
ing more a role more akin to that of a constitutional court; the ECtHR 
moved from being a ‘fine-tuner’ of national legal systems to a ‘scrutiniser of 
failing legal and political systems.’ (Sadurski 2009, 401). 
This approach resulted in the use of ‘pilot judgements’ by the ECtHR 
where widespread and systemic violations were identified and the State or-
dered to take far reaching steps in redress. (Sadurski 2009, 402). This change 
of emphasis was underpinned by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe which instructed the ECtHR to identify violations which result 
from ‘an underlying systemic problem…in particular when it is likely to give 
rise to numerous applications, so as to assist states in finding the appropriate 
solution.’ (Resolution Res (2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers) Sadurski 
(2009,420-421) argues that the ECtHR have used ‘pilot judgements’ to try 
to create alliances with domestic constitutional courts to offer their support 
in bringing pressure on the legislative and executive branches of a state to 
bring them in line with internationally agreed standards of human rights 
protections. Evans (2010) argues that this type of alliance can be seen in 
the way in which the ECtHR supported the Moldovan domestic Supreme 
Court in Biserica Adevarat Ortodoza din Moldova and Others v Moldova 
(2007) finding against the Moldovan Government’s refusal to register a re-
ligious group ‘The True Orthodox Church of Moldova.’ Although Sadurski 
(2009, 429) casts doubt on whether the political conditions within Russia, a 
state where many Article 9 challenges have originated, are sufficiently recep-
tive to give proper effect to pilot judgements, a point which will be explored 
further below.  
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Freedom of Religion in Contemporary Russia
This paper will now consider contemporary relations between the Russian 
state and religious communities active in Russia in the context of approach-
es to religious freedom in the Soviet era. The limited amount of religious 
toleration in pre Soviet Russia gave way to an openly hostile approach to 
religious communities after the revolution. Lunkin (2012) argues that the 
Soviet state divided religious communities into those who were supportive 
of the state and those who were a threat to it and this conceptual approach 
is also evident in aspects of the approach of the State to religious minorities 
in post-Soviet Russia:
At the same time, in this new stage of Russian history, the ideological ste-
reotypes and complexes rooted in the prerevolutionary and Soviet periods 
were embraced by the state. This produced the tendency to label adherents 
of non-traditional religions “sectarians” and harass them, as well as to 
identify the religious figures who were most loyal to the government, ul-
timately creating the foundation for the new regime’s legitimacy by pro-
moting the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a symbol and pillar of 
state ideology. From the mid-1990s on, representatives of the Moscow Pa-
triarchate joined with the ruling elite in attempts to suppress the freedom 
of religious competitors by employing xenophobic slogans that manifested 
support for the “traditional” religions and opposition to “sects,” foreign 
missionaries, and Western influence in general. (Lunkin 2012, 157-8) 
This current of suspicion of minority and non-indigenous religious groups 
led to the passing of restrictive legislation in 1997 in the form of the Federal 
Law on freedom of conscience and religious associations (no. 125-FZ of 26 
September 1997 – “the Religions Act”)17. Lunkin provides a helpful sum-
mary of some of the key elements of the Religions Act:
The law essentially divided organizations into traditional (Orthodoxy, 
Islam, Buddhism, Judaism) and nontraditional (all the rest). Procedures 
involved in the establishment of an organization were changed substan-
tially, in some cases restricting the eligibility of founders and members. 
For example, the right to establish a local religious organization was rec-
ognized as applying only to Russian citizens (Article 9). Foreign nationals 
and stateless citizens (including displaced persons) may be participants in 
a religious organization provided that their permanent residence is within 
17 See Durham and Homer 1998 for a detailed appraisal of this provision. 
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the Russian Federation (Article 3). Positively the law introduced a new 
definition of religious group as a voluntary association of individuals 
formed for the collective practice and proliferation of their faith, which 
can operate without official state recognition (Article 7). On the one hand, 
this legal provision vested in the religious associations the right to operate 
legally without being subject to state registration or interference. On the 
other hand, it required a fifteen-year probation period of activity within 
the territory of the Russian Federation for religious associations to enjoy 
such rights (Article 11, §5). (Lunkin 2012, 161) 
The judicial interpretation of this legislation by the Constitutional Court in 
1999 softened some of its effects in practice (see Lunkin 2012, 161) but the 
requirements to register and the impact on minority religions has been the 
subject of several judgments against Russia by the ECtHR. Lunkin (2012, 
162) argues that this was partly due to a more intolerant approach by the 
Putin regime which saw administrative measures aimed at disrupting the 
activities of missionaries and religious minorities18. 
A number of ECtHR cases illustrate the difficulties presented by the 
Russian attempts to control the activities of minority religious groups via 
the Religions Act, some of which will be discussed below. For example, Mos-
cow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia (2007) concerned a Salvation 
Army group in Moscow. The Salvation Army had been present in Russia 
from 1913 but was dissolved in 1923 after being declared an anti-Soviet 
group. A group reformed in 1992 and as a result The Salvation Army re-
sumed its activities in 1992 and was registered as a religious association. As 
a result of the 1997 Religions Act the group were required to re-register and 
ensure their articles of association complied with the current law by De-
cember 1999. The applicants attempted to do so in February 1999 but their 
application was refused and the Moscow authorities applied for the dissolu-
tion for the organisation. The ECtHR found that Russia was in breach of 
Article 11 read in light of Article 9 and reiterated the importance of the 
autonomy of religious groups in a democratic state:
[T]he autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for 
pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of 
the protection which Article 9 affords. The State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality, as defined in the Court’s case-law, is incompatible with any 
power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs. 
18 Note that there has been a softening of the 15 year requirement (Sibireva 2016) but recent 
legislative developments suggest that future Article 9 challenges are likely (Associated Press 
2016). 
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…the Court has often referred to the essential role played by political par-
ties in ensuring pluralism and democracy, associations formed for other 
purposes, including those proclaiming or teaching religion, are also im-
portant to the proper functioning of democracy. For pluralism is also built 
on the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynam-
ics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, 
artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts. The harmonious 
interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for 
achieving social cohesion.19 (Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. 
Russia (2007) at [58 and 61])
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (2010) is a similar case concerning a 
community of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia which also resulted in a find-
ing of a violation of Article 9 read with Article 11. In a strongly worded 
judgment the court found that a decision to dissolve the applicant com-
munity, revoke legal personality and to ban its future activities was dispro-
portionate, indeed ‘a blanket ban on the activities of a religious community 
belonging to a known Christian denomination is an extraordinary occur-
rence.’ (Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (2010) at [155])
The court went on to point out that ‘the permanent dissolution of the 
applicant community, coupled with a ban on its activities, constituted a 
drastic measure disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’  (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (2010) at [159])
The court identified that this was one of a number of instances where:
in the period following the enactment of the 1997 Religions Act where the 
authorities have consistently denied reregistration to religious organisa-
tions which were described as “nontraditional religions”, including The 
Salvation Army and the Church of Scientology. The Court found in both 
cases that “the Moscow authorities did not act in good faith and neglected 
their duty of neutrality and impartiality.” (Jehovah’s Witnesses of Mos-
cow v. Russia (2010) at [157])20
The pattern identified above continued in the case of Church of Scientology 
of St Petersburg and Others v. Russia (2014). Here the applicant Church was 
19 Note that violations on similar grounds were found against Austria in Jehovas Zeugen in 
Osterreich v. Austria (2012) and Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. 
Austria (2008) 
20 A series of similar cases with findings against Russia include Church of Scientology Moscow 
v. Russia (2008) 46 EHRR 304, Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v. Russia App no 
33203/08 (ECtHR, 12 June 2014), Taganrog Lro and Others v. Russia App no 32401/10, case 
communicated 6 March 2014
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refused permission to register as a religious organisation under the Religions 
Act. It observed that:
pursuant to Russia’s Religions Act, a “religious group” without legal per-
sonality cannot possess or exercise the rights associated exclusively with the 
legal-entity status of a registered “religious organisation” – such as the 
rights to own or rent property, to maintain bank accounts, to ensure ju-
dicial protection of the community, to establish places of worship, to hold 
religious services in places accessible to the public, or to produce, obtain 
and distribute religious literature – which are essential for exercising the 
right to manifest one’s religion … Thus, the restricted status afforded to 
“religious groups” under the Religions Act did not allow members of such 
a group to enjoy effectively their right to freedom of religion, rendering 
such a right illusory and theoretical rather than practical and effective, as 
required by the Convention. (Church of Scientology of St Petersburg and 
Others v. Russia (2014) at [38])
Thus this case is a further illustration of the attempts by the Russian Federa-
tion to control the activities of religious groups that are perceived as ‘non- 
traditional.’ The final section of this paper will offer some concluding re-
marks on the challenges faced by ‘non-traditional’ religious groups seeking 
legal recognition in Eastern European jurisdictions.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that in principle the rights and duties that constitute 
legal personality can coalesce around any entity including a religious group. 
In this way legal personality can be seen as a legal construction which is re-
vealing of wider social attitudes and political imperatives. The ECtHR has a 
developed jurisprudence which points to the importance of the conferral of 
legal personality to enable religious groups to have full access to the freedom 
of religion and association under Articles 9 and 11 of the ECHR.21 However 
in the absence of an overarching definition of ‘religion’ in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR there is a danger that when the domestic authorities decide 
whether a particular religious group qualifies for the conferral of legal per-
sonality there is space for assumptions to be made as to what counts as 
21 This is an approach that has been firmly endorsed by the OSCE which asserts that ‘obtaining 
legal personality status should be open to as many communities as possible, without 
excluding any community on the grounds that it is not a traditional or recognized religion 
or through excessively narrow interpretations or definitions of religion or belief.’ (OSCE/
ODHIR 2014 at [26]).
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‘religion.’  Such assumptions are socially and politically constructed and this 
paper has shown that this can result in legal protection being more readily 
offered to religious groups which resemble orthodox established forms of 
religiosity at the expense of non-traditional or minority religious groups. 22 
As such the formal protections and advantages provided by domestic law 
to religious groups can act as both a means of inclusion and of exclusion. 
Evidence from the recent ECtHR case law on freedom of religion 
demonstrates that systems of registration at the domestic level in Eastern 
European jurisdictions have been applied in a manner that discriminates 
against ‘non-traditional’ religious groups, including minority religions and 
new religious movements.  As such the conferral of legal personality on reli-
gious groups in these instances is informed by the ‘realist’ approach to legal 
personality, in that legal personality is more easily conferred on religious 
organisations which fit the pre-existing templates of what a religion should 
‘conventionally’ look like. 
Further, the decision to grant or withhold legal personality to particu-
lar religious groups illustrates the role of the State in the social and po-
litical construction of religion whereby certain manifestations of religiosity 
are deemed to be in some way undesirable and to be excluded, leading to 
discrimination against minority religions and new religious movements.  In 
this way the decision to grant or withhold legal personality to particular 
religious groups illustrates the role of the State in the social construction of 
religion and is thus a means of State control of religious freedom.
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Hugh McFaul 
Juridinis statusas, religinės grupės ir religijos 
įsitvirtinimas Rytų Europoje 
Santrauka
Svarbus religijos vaidmens viešajame sektoriuje aspektas yra valstybes noras prisitai-
kyti prie religinių grupių, taip pat prie šioms grupėms priklausančių asmenų. Religi-
jos vaidmuo viešojoje erdvėje priklauso nuo konkrečios valstybės įstatymų bei politi-
kų, kurie nusprendžia pripažinti tam tikrus įsitikinimus ir praktiką, kaip religinius. 
Tam tikrais atvejais šis pripažinimas priklauso nuo religinių grupių galimybės įgyti 
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juridinį statusą. Pasiekti tokį pripažinimą religinėms grupėms gana problemiška, 
ypač Rytų Europos jurisdikcijose. 
Šiame straipsnyje siekiama išnagrinėti valstybės atsaką į religines grupes, įskaitant 
naujas religines kryptis, remiantis Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo bylų naujausia 
praktika. Straipsnyje didelis dėmesys skiriamas tam, kokiu lygmeniu religinių grupių 
juridinio statuso įgijimas gali riboti arba kitaip paveikti šių grupių įsitvirtinimą. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: žmogaus teisės, religijos ir tikėjimo laisvė, religinė organizaci-
ja, juridinis statusas, religinės mažumos.
